High Performance Logistic Regression for Privacy-Preserving Genome
  Analysis by De Cock, Martine et al.
1High Performance Logistic Regression
for Privacy-Preserving Genome Analysis
Martine De Cock, Rafael Dowsley, Anderson C. A. Nascimento,
Davis Railsback, Jianwei Shen, Ariel Todoki
Abstract—In biomedical applications, valuable data is often
split between owners who cannot openly share the data be-
cause of privacy regulations and concerns. Training Machine
Learning models on the joint data without violating privacy
is a major technology challenge that can be addressed by
combining techniques from Machine Learning and cryptography.
When collaboratively training Machine Learning models with the
cryptographic technique named secure Multi-Party Computation,
the price paid for keeping the data of the owners private is an
increase in computational cost and runtime. A careful choice of
Machine Learning techniques, algorithmic and implementation
optimizations are a necessity to enable practical secure Machine
Learning over distributed data sets. Such optimizations can be
tailored to the kind of data and Machine Learning problem at
hand.
Our setup involves secure Two-Party Computation protocols,
along with a trusted initializer that distributes correlated ran-
domness to the two computing parties. We use a gradient descent
based algorithm for training a logistic regression model, and we
break down the algorithm into corresponding cryptographic pro-
tocols. Our main contributions are a new protocol for computing
the activation function that requires neither secure comparison
protocols nor Yao’s garbled circuits, and a series of cryptographic
engineering optimizations to improve the performance. To the
best of our knowledge, we present the fastest existing secure
Multi-Party Computation implementation for training logistic
regression models on high dimensional genome data distributed
across a local area network.
For our largest gene expression data set, we train a model
that requires over 7 billion secure multiplications; the training
completes in about 26.90 seconds in a local area network. The
implementation in this work is a further optimized version of
the implementation with which we won first place in Track 4 of
the iDASH 2019 secure genome analysis competition.
Index Terms—Logistic regression, Gradient descent, Machine
Learning, Secure Multi-Party Computation, Gene expression
data
I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) has many applications in the
biomedical domain, such as medical diagnosis and personal-
ized medicine. Biomedical data sets are typically characterized
by high dimensionality, i.e. a high number of features such as
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lab test results or gene expression values, and low sample
size, i.e. a small number of training examples corresponding
to e.g. patients or tissue samples. Adding to these challenges,
valuable training data is often split between parties (data
owners) who cannot openly share the data because of privacy
regulations and concerns. Due to these concerns, privacy-
preserving solutions, using techniques such as secure Multi-
Party Computation (MPC), become important so that this data
can still be used to train ML models, perform a diagnosis, and
in some cases even derive genomic diagnoses [25].
We tackle the problem of training a binary classifier on
high dimensional gene expression data held by different data
owners, while keeping the training data private. This work
is directly inspired by Track 4 of the iDASH 2019 secure
genome analysis competition1. The iDASH competition is a
yearly international competition for participants to create and
implement privacy-preserving protocols for applications with
genomic data. The goal is in evaluating the best-known secure
methods and advancing new techniques to solve real-world
problems in handling genomic data. In the 2019 edition there
were a total of four different tracks, where Track 4 invited
participants to design MPC solutions for collaborative training
of ML models originating from multiple data owners. One
of the Track 4 competition data sets consists of 470 training
examples (records) with 17,814 numeric features, while the
other consists of 225 training examples with 12,634 numeric
features. An initial 5-fold cross-validation analysis in the clear,
i.e. without any encryption, indicated that in both cases logistic
regression (LR) models are capable of yielding the level of
prediction accuracy expected in the competition, prompting
us to investigate MPC-based protocols for secure LR training.
The competition requirements implied the existence of mul-
tiple data owners who each send their training example(s) in an
encrypted or secret shared form to data processors (computing
nodes), as illustrated in Figure 1. The honest-but-curious data
processors are not to learn anything about the data as they
engage in computations and communications with each other.
At the end, they disclose the trained classifier – in our case, the
coefficients of the LR model – to the data owners. Since the
data processors cannot learn anything about the values in the
data set, this implies that our protocol is applicable in a wide
range of scenarios, independently of how the original data is
split by ownership. Our protocol works in scenarios where
the data is horizontally partitioned, i.e. when each data owner
1http://www.humangenomeprivacy.org/2019/competition-tasks.html,
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2has different records of the data, such as data belonging to
different patients. It also works in scenarios where the data is
vertically partitioned, i.e. when each data owner has different
features of the data, such as the expression values for different
genes.
The main novelty points of our solution for private LR
training over a distributed data set are: (i) a new protocol
for securely computing the activation function that avoids
the use of full-fledged secure comparison protocols; (ii) a
novel method for bit decomposing secret shared integers and
bundling their instantiations; and (iii) several cryptographic
engineering enhancements that together with the novel pro-
tocol for the activation function gave us the fastest privacy-
preserving LR implementation in the world when run in local
area networks (LANs). In summary, we designed a concrete
solution for fast secure training of a binary classifier over gene
expression data that meets the strict security requirements of
the iDASH 2019 competition. For our largest data set, we train
a model that requires over 7 billion secure multiplications and
the training completes in about 26.9 seconds in a LAN.
This paper significantly expands over a preliminary version
of this result [13], presented at a workshop without formal
proceedings. In this version we have a formal description of
all protocols, security proofs and improved running times.
We first discuss below our work as compared to others. In
the Section Methods, we present preliminary information on
MPC, describe the secure subprotocols that are building blocks
for our secure LR training protocol, and finally describe the
protocol itself. In the Section Results we describe details of
our implementation and runtime results for the overall protocol
and microbenchmarks for our secure activation function pro-
tocol. We experimentally compare our solution with the state-
of-the-art SecureML approach [28], demonstrating substantial
runtime improvements. In the Section Discussion, we note
possible future work to improve and extend our results, and
finally in the Section Conclusions we present our summary
remarks.
B. Related Work
A variety of efforts have previously been made to train LR
classifiers in a privacy-preserving way.
One scenario that was considered in previous works [4], [8],
[27] is the setting in which a data owner holds the data while
another party (the data processor), such as a cloud service, is
responsible for the model training. These solutions usually rely
on homomorphic encryption, with the data owner encrypting
and sending their data to the data processor who performs
computations on the encrypted data without having to decrypt
it.
When the data is held by multiple data owners, they can
either execute an MPC protocol among themselves to train the
model, or delegate the computation to a set of data processors
that run a MPC protocol. It is the latter setting that we follow
in this paper.
Existing MPC approaches to secure LR differ in the nu-
merical optimization algorithms used for LR training and in
the cryptographic primitives leveraged [21], [28], [29], [38].
The SPARK protocol [21] uses additive homomorphic encryp-
tion (Paillier cryptosystem) and uses Newton-Raphson as the
numerical optimization algorithm to find the values of the
weights that maximize the log-likelihood. The SPARK proto-
col can use the actual logistic function without approximating
it at the cost of the plaintext data being horizontally partitioned
and seen by the data processors. The two protocols from [29]
rely on the Newton-Raphson method, both approximate the
logistic function, and both use additive secret sharing. The first
protocol includes the use of Yao’s garbled circuits to compute
the approximation of the logistic function, while the second
protocol uses a Taylor approximation and Euler’s method.
The PrivLogit method [38] uses Yao’s garbled circuits and
Paillier encryption; their protocol uses the Newton-Raphson
method and a constant Hessian approximation to speed up
computation. However, this protocol relies on the plaintext
data being horizontally partitioned and seen by the data
processors, which, like the work in [21], would not align with
the iDASH 2019 competition requirements. We also point out
a protocol secure against active adversaries from SecureNN
[35] for computing a ReLu. While we compute a different
function (clipped ReLu), we share a similar idea that using
the most significant bit of an input can tell us the output of
the function.
The work closest to ours is SecureML [28], which was
the fastest protocol for privately training LR models based on
secure MPC prior to our work. SecureML separates the data
owners from the data processors, and uses mini-batch gradient
descent. The main novelty points of SecureML are a clipped
ReLu activation function, a novel truncation protocol, and a
combination of garbled circuits and secret sharing based MPC
in order to obtain a good trade-off between communication,
computation and round complexities. The SecureML protocol
is evaluated on a data set with up to 5,000 features, while –
to the best of our knowledge – the existing runtime evaluation
of all other approaches for MPC based LR training is limited
to 400 features or less [21], [29], [38]. Like our solution, the
SecureML protocol is split into an offline and online phase
(the offline phase can be executed before the inputs are known
and is responsible for generating multiplication triples). The
SecureML solution is based on two servers, while our solution
is based on three servers, namely a party who pre-computes
so-called multiplication triples in the off-line stage, and two
parties who actively compute the final result. If we exclude
the preprocessing/off-line stage from SecureML and exclude
the pre-distribution of triples in our solution, we are left with
protocols that work in exactly the same setting. We compare
the runtime of both solutions in the Section Results, showing
that our implementation is substantially faster.
A preliminary version of this work appeared in a workshop
without formal proceedings [13]. This paper is a substantially
longer and detailed description that includes security proofs,
detailed comparison with the state-of-the-art, and improved
running times.
3Fig. 1. Overview of MPC based secure logistic regression (LR) training. Each of n data owners secret shares their own training data between two data
processors. The data processors engage in computations and communications to train a ML model, which is at the end revealed to the data owners.
Fig. 2. Architecture: (a) Neuron; (b) Approximation of sigmoid activation function σ by clipped ReLu ρ
II. METHODS
A. Logistic Regression
Logistic regression is a common Machine Learning al-
gorithm for binary classification. The training data D con-
sists of training examples d = (xd, td) in which xd =
〈xd,1, xd,2, ..., xd,m〉 is an m-dimensional numerical vector,
containing the values of m input attributes for example d,
and td ∈ {0, 1} is the ground truth class label. Each xd,i for
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} is a real number value.
As illustrated in Figure 2(a), we train a neuron to map
the xd’s to the corresponding td’s, correctly classifying the
examples. The neuron computes a weighted sum of the inputs
(the values of the weights are learned during training) and
subsequently applies an activation function to it, to arrive at
the output od = f(w0·xd,0+w1·xd,1+· · ·+wn·xd,n), which is
interpreted as the probability that the class label is 1. Note that,
as is common in neural network training, we extend the input
attribute vector with a dummy feature xd,0 which has value
1 for all xd’s. The traditionally used activation function for
LR is the sigmoid function σ(z) = 11+e−z . Since the sigmoid
function σ requires division and evaluation of an exponential
function, which are expensive operations to perform in MPC,
we approximate it with the activation function ρ from [28],
which is shown in Figure 2(b).
For training, we use the full gradient descent based algo-
rithm shown in Algorithm 1 to learn the weights for the LR
model. On line 3, we choose not to use early stopping2 because
in that case the number of iterations would depend on the
values in the training data, hence leaking information [29].
Instead, we use a fixed number of iterations during training.
B. Our scenario
In the scenario considered in this work the data is not
held by a single party that performs all the computation, but
distributed by the data owners to the data processors in such
2This is a technique that uses a metric, such as the accuracy on a held-out
validation data set, to check when a model starts to overfit and will then stop
training at that point.
4Algorithm 1: Full Gradient Descent
Input : A set D with training examples (xd, td); a
learning rate η
Output: Weights wi that minimize the sum of squared
errors over the training data
1 for i← 0 to m do
2 wi ← 0
3 until termination condition is met do
4 for i← 0 to m do
5 ∆wi ← 0
6 for each (xd, td) in D do
7 od ← ρ(w0 · xd,0 + w1 · xd,1 + . . .+ wm · xd,m)
8 for i← 0 to m do
9 ∆wi ← ∆wi + η(td − od)xd,i
10 for i← 0 to m do
11 wi ← wi + ∆wi
12 return w0, . . . , wm
way that each data processor does not have any information
about the data in the clear. Nevertheless, the data processors
would still like to compute a LR model without leaking any
other information about the data used for the training. To
achieve this goal, we will use techniques from MPC.
Our setup is illustrated in Figure 1. We have multiple data
owners who each hold disjoint parts of the data that is going to
be used for the training. This is the most general approach and
covers the cases in which the data is horizontally partitioned
(i.e. for each training sample d = (xd, td), all the data for
d is held by one of the data owners), vertically partitioned
(for each feature, the values of that feature for all training
samples are held by one of the data owners), and even arbitrary
partitions. There are two data processors who collaborate to
train a LR model using secure MPC protocols, and a trusted
initializer (TI) that predistributes correlated randomness to
the data processors in order to make the MPC computation
more efficient. The TI is not involved in any other part of the
execution, and does not learn any data from the data owners
or data processors.
We next present the security model that is used and several
secure building blocks, so that afterwards we can combine
them in order to obtain a secure LR training protocol.
C. Security Model
The security model in which we analyze our protocol
is the Universal Composability (UC) framework [5] as it
provides the strongest security and composability guarantees
and is the gold standard for analyzing cryptographic protocols
nowadays. Here we will only give a short overview of the UC
framework (for the specific case of two-party protocols), and
refer interested readers to the book of Cramer et al. [9] for a
detailed explanation.
The main advantage of the UC framework is that the UC
composition theorem guarantees that any protocol proven UC-
secure can also be securely composed with other copies of
itself and of other protocols (even with arbitrarily concurrent
executions) while preserving its security. Such guarantee is
very useful since it allows the modular design of complex pro-
tocols, and is a necessity for protocols executing in complex
environments such as the Internet.
The UC framework first considers a real world scenario in
which the two protocol participants (the data processors from
Figure 1, henceforth denoted Alice and Bob) interact between
themselves and with an adversary A and an environment Z
(that captures all activity external to the single execution of
the protocol that is under consideration). The environment Z
gives the inputs and gets the outputs from Alice and Bob. The
adversary A delivers the messages exchanged between Alice
and Bob (thus modeling an adversarial network scheduling)
and can corrupt one of the participants, in which case he
gains the control over it. In order to define security, an ideal
world is also considered. In this ideal world, an idealized
version of the functionality that the protocol is supposed to
perform is defined. The ideal functionality F receives the
inputs directly from Alice and Bob, performs the computations
locally following the primitive specification and delivers the
outputs directly to Alice and Bob. A protocol pi executing
in the real world is said to UC-realize functionality F if for
every adversary A there exists a simulator S such that no
environment Z can distinguish between: (1) an execution of
the protocol pi in the real world with participants Alice and
Bob, and adversary A; (2) and an ideal execution with dummy
parties (that only forward inputs/outputs), F and S.
This work like the vast majority of the privacy-preserving
machine learning protocols in the literature considers honest-
but-curious, static adversaries. In more detail, the adversary
chooses the party that he wants to corrupt before the protocol
execution and he also follows the protocol instructions (but
tries to learn additional information). We consider the trusted
initializer model, in which a trusted initializer functionality
FDTI pre-distributes correlated randomness to Alice and Bob.3
A trusted initializer has been often used to enable highly
efficient solutions both in the context of privacy-preserving
machine learning [14], [10], [22], [12], [31] as well as in other
applications, e.g., [32], [19], [18], [24], [34], [11].
Functionality FDTI
FDTI is parametrized by an algorithm D for sampling
the correlated randomness. Upon initialization, run
(DA, DB)
$← D, and deliver DA to Alice and DB
to Bob.
Simplifications: In our proofs the simulation strategy is
simple and will be described briefly: all the messages look
uniformly random from the recipient’s point of view, except
for the messages that open a secret shared value to a party,
but these ones can be easily simulated using the output of the
respective functionalities. Therefore a simulator S, having the
3Using a setup assumption, like the trusted initializer, in the MPC protocol
is a necessity in order to get UC-security [6], [7]. Other possible setup
assumption to achieve UC-security include: a common reference string [6],
[7], [30], the availability of a public-key infrastructure [1], the random oracle
model [23], [2], the existence of noisy channels between the parties [16], [20],
and the availability of tamper-proof hardware [26], [17].
5leverage of being able to simulate the trusted initializer func-
tionality FDTI in the ideal world, can easily perform a perfect
simulation of a real protocol execution; therefore making the
real and ideal worlds indistinguishable for any environment Z .
In the ideal functionalities the messages are public delayed
outputs, meaning that the simulator is first asked whether
they should be delivered or not (this is due to the modeling
that the adversary controls the network scheduling). This fact
as well as the session identifications are omitted from our
functionalities’ descriptions for the sake of readability.
D. Secret Sharing Based Secure Multi-Party Computation
Our MPC solution is based on additive secret sharing over
a ring Zq = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. When secret sharing a value
x ∈ Zq , Alice and Bob receive shares xA and xB , respectively,
that are chosen uniformly at random in Zq with the constraint
that xA + xB = x mod q. We denote the pair of shares by
[[x]]q . All computations are modulo q and the modular notation
is henceforth omitted for conciseness. Note that no information
of the secret value x is revealed to either party holding only
one share. The secret shared value can be revealed/opened
to each party by combining both shares. Some operations
on secret shared values can be computed locally with no
communication. Let [[x]]q , [[y]]q be secret shared values and
c be a constant. Alice and Bob can perform the following
operations locally:
• Addition (z = x + y): Each party locally adds its local
shares of x and y in order to obtain a share of z. This
will be denoted by [[z]]q ← [[x]]q + [[y]]q .
• Subtraction (z = x− y): Each party locally subtracts its
local share of y from that of x in order to obtain a share
of z. This will be denoted by [[z]]q ← [[x]]q − [[y]]q .
• Multiplication by a constant (z = cx): Each party
multiplies its local share of x by c to obtain a share of
z. This will be denoted by [[z]]q ← c[[x]]q
• Addition of a constant (z = x + c): Alice adds c to her
share xA of x to obtain zA, while Bob sets zB = xB .
This will be denoted by [[z]]q ← [[x]]q + c.
The secure multiplication of secret shared values (i.e.,
z = xy) cannot be done locally and involves communication
between Alice and Bob. To obtain an efficient secure multi-
plication solution, we use the multiplication triples technique
that was originally proposed by Beaver [3]. We use a trusted
initializer to pre-distribute the multiplication triples (which are
a form of correlated randomness) to Alice and Bob. We use
the same protocol piDMM for secure (matrix) multiplication of
secret shared values as in [12], [15] and denote by piDM the
protocol for the special case of multiplication of scalars and
piIP for the inner product. As shown in [12] the protocol piDMM
(described in Protocol 2) UC-realizes the distributed matrix
multiplication functionality FDMM in the trusted initializer
model.
Functionality FDMM
FDMM runs with Alice and Bob and is parametrized
by the size q of the ring Zq and the dimensions (i, j)
and (j, k) of the matrices.
Input: Upon receiving a message from Alice/Bob
with its shares of JXKq and JY Kq , verify if the share
of X is in Zi×jq and the share of Y is in Zj×kq . If it
is not, abort. Otherwise, record the shares, ignore any
subsequent message from that party and inform the
other party about the receipt.
Output: Upon receipt of the shares from both par-
ties, reconstruct X and Y from the shares, compute
Z = XY and create a secret sharing JZK
q
to distribute
to Alice and Bob: a corrupt party fixes its share of
the output to any chosen matrix and the shares of
the uncorrupted parties are then created by picking
uniformly random values subject to the correctness
constraint.
Protocol 2: Secure Distributed Matrix Multiplication Pro-
tocol piDMM
Input : [[X]]q , [[Y ]]q
Output: [[Z]]q such that Z = XY
1 The protocol is parametrized by the size q of the ring Zq
and the dimensions (i, j) and (j, k) of the matrices. The
trusted initializer chooses uniformly random U and V
in Zi×jq and Zj×kq , respectively, computes W = UV and
pre-distributes secret sharings [[U ]]q, [[V ]]q, [[W ]]q to
Alice and Bob.
2 Alice and Bob locally compute [[D]]q ← [[X]]q − [[U ]]q
and [[E]]q ← [[Y ]]q − [[V ]]q , and then open D and E.
3 Alice and Bob locally compute
[[Z]]q ← [[W ]]q + E[[U ]]q +D[[V ]]q +DE.
4 return [[Z]]q
E. Converting to Fixed-Point Representation
Each data owner initially needs to convert their training
data to integers modulo q so that they can be secret shared.
As illustrated in Figure 3, each feature value x ∈ R is
converted into a fixed point approximation of x using a two’s
complement representation for negative numbers. We define
this new value as Q(x) ∈ Zq . This conversion is shown in
Equation (1):
Q(x) =
{
2λ − b2a · |x|c if x < 0
b2a · xc if x ≥ 0 (1)
Specifically, when we convert Q(x) into its bit represen-
tation, we define the first a bits from the right to hold the
fractional part of x, and the next b bits to represent the non-
negative integer part of x, and the most significant bit (MSB)
to represent the sign (positive or negative). We define λ to
represent the total number of bits such that the ring size q is
defined as q = 2λ. It is important to choose a λ that is large
enough to represent the largest number x that can be produced
6Fig. 3. Fixed-Point Representation: Register map of fixed-point representation of numbers shared over Z2λ with examples.
during the LR protocol, and therefore λ should be chosen to
be at least 2(a + b) (see Truncation). It is also important to
choose a b that is large enough to represent the maximum
possible value of the integer part of all x’s (this is dependent
on the data). This conversion and bit representation is shown
in Figure 3.
F. Truncation
When multiplying numbers that were converted into a fixed
point representation with a fractional bits, the resulting product
will end up with a more bits representing the fractional part.
For example, a fixed point representation of x and y, for x, y >
0, is x · 2a and y · 2a, respectively. The multiplication of both
these terms results in xy · 22a, showing that now 2a bits are
representing the fractional part, which we must scale back
down to xy ·2a to do any further computations. In our solution,
we use the two-party local truncation protocol for fixed point
representations of real numbers proposed in [28] that we will
refer to as pitrunc. It does not involve any messages between
the two parties, each party simply performs an operation on its
own local share. This protocol almost always incurs an error
of at most a bit flip in the least-significant bit. However, with
probability 2a+1−λ, where a is the number of fractional bits,
the resulting value is completely random.
When this truncation protocol is performed on increasingly
large data sets (in our case we run over 7 billion secure
multiplications), the probability of an erroneous truncation
becomes a real issue – an issue not significant in previous
implementations. There are two phases in which truncation
is performed: (1) when computing the dot product (inner
product) of the current weights vector with a training example
in line 7 of Algorithm 1, and (2) when the weight differentials
(∆wi) are adjusted in line 9 of Algorithm 1. If a truncation
error occurs during (1), the resulting erroneous value will be
pushed into a reasonable range by the activation function and
incur only a minor error for that round. If the error occurs
during (2), an element of the weights vector will be updated
to a completely random ring element and recovery from this
error will be impossible. To mitigate this in experiments, we
make use of 10-12 bits of fractional precision with a ring size
of 64 bits, making the probability of failure 1253 < p <
1
251 .
The number of truncations that need to be performed is
also reduced in our implementation by waiting to perform
truncation until it is absolutely required. For instance, instead
of truncating each result of multiplication between an attribute
and its corresponding weight, a single truncation can be
performed at the end of the entire dot product.
Additional error is incurred on the accuracy by the fixed
point representation itself. Through cross-validation with an
in-the-clear implementation, we determined that 12 bits of
fractional precision provide enough accuracy to make the
output accuracy indistinguishable between the secure version
and the plaintext version.
G. Conversion of Sharings
For efficiency reasons, in some of the steps for securely
computing the activation function we use secret sharings over
Z2, while in others we use secret sharings over Z2λ . Therefore
we need to be able to convert between the two types of secret
sharings.
We use the two-party protocol from [12] for performing
the bit-decomposition of a secret-shared value [[x]]2λ to sharesJxiK2 , where xλ · · ·x1 is the binary representation of x. It
works like the ripple carry adder arithmetic circuit based on the
7insight that the difference between the sum of the two additive
shares held by the parties and an “XOR-sharing” of that sum
is the carry vector. As proven in [12], the bit-decomposition
protocol pidecomp (described in Protocol 3) UC-realizes the bit-
decomposition functionality Fdecomp.
Functionality Fdecomp
Fdecomp runs with Alice and Bob and is parametrized
by the bit-length λ of the value x being converted
from additive sharings [[x]]2λ in Z2λ to additive
bitwise sharings JxiK2 in Z2 such that x = xλ · · ·x1.
Input: Upon receiving a message from Alice or
Bob with its share of [[x]]2λ , record the share, ignore
any subsequent messages from that party and inform
the other party about the receipt.
Output: Upon receipt of the inputs from both
parties, reconstruct the value x = xλ · · ·x1 from the
shares, and for i ∈ {1, . . . , λ} distribute new sharingsJxiK2 of the bit xi. Before the output deliver, the
corrupt party fix its shares of the output to any desired
value. The shares of the uncorrupted parties are then
created by picking uniformly random values subject
to the correctness constraints.
Protocol 3: Secure Two-Party Bit-Decomposition Protocol
pidecomp
Input : [[x]]2λ
Output: JxiK2 , where xλ · · ·x1 is the binary
representation of x.
1 All distributed multiplications are over Z2 and the
required correlated randomness is pre-distributed by the
trusted initializer.
2 Let a denote Alice’s share of x, which corresponds to a
bit string aλ . . . a1. Similarly, let b denote Bob’s share
of x, which corresponds to a bit string bλ . . . b1. Define
the secret sharings JyiK2 as the pair of shares (ai, bi)
for yi = ai + bi mod 2, JaiK2 as (ai, 0) and JbiK2 as
(0, bi).
3 Compute Jc1K2 ← Ja1K2Jb1K2 and set Jx1K2 ← Jy1K2 .
4 for i← 2 to λ do
5 Compute JdiK2 ← JaiK2JbiK2 + 1.
6 JeiK2 ← JyiK2Jci−1K2 + 1
7 JciK2 ← JeiK2JdiK2 + 1
8 JxiK2 ← JyiK2 + Jci−1K2
9 end
10 return JxiK2 for i ∈ {1, . . . , λ}
In our implementation we use a highly parallelized and
optimized version of the bit-decomposition protocol pidecomp in
order to improve the communication efficiency of the overall
solution. The optimizations are described in the Appendix.
The opposite of a secure bit-decomposition is converting
from bit sharing to an additive sharing over a larger ring. In
our secure activation function protocol, we require securely
converting a bit sharing to an additive sharing in 2λ. This is
done using the protocol pi2to2λ from [31] (described in Protocol
4) that UC-realizes the secret sharing conversion functionality
F2to2λ .
Functionality F2to2λ
F2to2λ is parametrized by the bit-length λ of the ring
in which the output is shared.
Input: Upon receiving a message from Alice/Bob
with her/his share of JxK2 , record the share, ignore
any subsequent messages from that party and inform
the other party about the receipt.
Output: Upon receipt of the inputs from both
parties, reconstruct x, then create and distribute to
Alice and Bob the secret sharing [[x]]2λ . Before the
deliver of the output shares, a corrupt party fix its
share of the output to any constant value. In both
cases the shares of the uncorrupted parties are then
created by picking uniformly random values subject
to the correctness constraint.
Protocol 4: Secure Secret Sharing Conversion Protocol
pi2to2λ
Input : [[x]]2
Output: [[x]]2λ
1 All distributed multiplications are over Z2λ and the
required correlated randomness is pre-distributed by the
trusted initializer.
2 For the input [[x]]2, let xA ∈ {0, 1} denote Alice’s share
and xB ∈ {0, 1} denote Bob’s share.
3 Alice creates a secret sharing [[xA]]2λ by picking
uniformly random shares that sum to xA and delivers
Bob’s share to him, and Bob proceeds similarly to
create [[xB ]]2λ .
4 [[y]]2λ ← [[xA]]2λ [[xB ]]2λ
5 [[z]]2λ ← [[xA]]2λ + [[xB ]]2λ − 2[[y]]2λ
6 return [[z]]2λ
H. Secure Activation Function
We propose a new protocol that evaluates ρ from Figure
2(b) directly over additive shares and does not require full
secure comparisons, which would have been more expensive.
Instead of doing straightforward comparisons between z, 0.5
and −0.5, we derive the result through checking two things:
(i) whether z′ = z + 1/2 is positive or negative; (ii) whether
z′ ≥ 1. Both checks can be performed without using a full
comparison protocol.
When z′ is bit decomposed, the most significant bit is 0 if
z′ is non-negative and 1 if z′ is negative. In fact, if out of the
λ bits, the a lowest bits are used to represent the fractional
component and the b next bits are used to represent the integer
component, then the remaining λ − a − b bits all have the
8same value as the most significant bit. We will use this fact in
order to optimize the protocol by only performing a partial bit-
decomposition and deducting whether z′ is positive or negative
from the (a+ b+ 1)-th bit.
In the case that z′ is negative, the output of ρ is 0. But, if z′
is positive, we need to determine whether z′ ≥ 1 in order to
know if the output of ρ should be fixed to 1 or to z′. A positive
z′ is such that z′ ≥ 1 if and only if at least one of the b bits
corresponding to the integer component of z′ representation is
equal to 1, therefore we only need to analyze those b bits to
determine if z′ ≥ 1.
Our secure protocol piρ is described in Protocol 5. The
AND operation corresponds to multiplications in Z2. By the
application of De Morgan’s law, the OR operation is performed
using the AND and negation operations. The successive multi-
plications can be optimized to only take a logarithmic number
of rounds by using well-known techniques.
The activation function protocol piρ UC-realizes the activa-
tion function functionality Fρ. The correctness can be checked
by inspecting the three possible cases: (i) if z > 1/2, then
pos = 1 and geq1 = 1 (since at least one of the bits
representing the integer component of z+1/2 will have a value
1). The output is thus [[2a]]2λ (the fixed-point representation
of 1); if −1/2 ≤ z < 1/2, then pos = 1 and geq1 = 0,
and therefore the output will be [[z′]]2λ , which is the fixed-
point representation of z + 1/2; if z < −1/2, then pos = 0
and the output will be a secret sharing representing zero as
expected. The security follows trivially from the UC-security
of the building blocks used and the fact that no secret sharing
is opened.
Functionality Fρ
Input: Upon receiving a message from Alice/Bob
with her/his share of [[z]]2λ , record the share, ignore
any subsequent messages from that party and inform
the other party about the receipt.
Output: Upon receipt of the inputs from both
parties, reconstruct z, compute the result of the
activation function ρ(z), and then create and distribute
to Alice and Bob the secret sharing [[ρ(z)]]2λ (using
the fixed-point representation). Before the deliver of
the output shares, a corrupt party fix its share of the
output to any constant value. In both cases the shares
of the uncorrupted parties are then created by picking
uniformly random values subject to the correctness
constraint.
I. Secure Logistic Regression Training
We now present our secure LR training protocol that uses
a combination of the previously mentioned building blocks.
Notice that in the full gradient descent technique described
in Algorithm 1, the only operations that cannot be performed
fully locally by the data processors, i.e. on their own local
shares, are:
• The computation of the inner product in line 7
Protocol 5: Secure Protocol piρ for Computing the Acti-
vation Function ρ.
Constraints: all values in Z2λ are representations of fixed
point approximations of real numbers s.t. the lowest a
bits represent the fractional component, the next b bits
represent the integer component and λ > a+ b. Further, a
negative value x is represented as 2λ − |x|.
Input : [[z]]2λ
Output: [[ρ(z)]]2λ
1 [[z′]]2λ ← [[z]]2λ + 2a−1
2 [[z′1]]2, . . . [[z
′
a+b+1]]2 ← pidecomp([[z′]]2λ ∧ (2a+b+2 − 1))
3 [[pos]]2λ ← pi2to2λ(1− [[z′a+b+1]]2)
4 [[geq1]]2 ←
∨
i∈{a+1,...,a+b}[[z
′
i]]2
5 [[geq1]]2λ ← pi2to2λ([[geq1]]2)
6 [[r]]2λ ← 2a[[geq1]]2λ + (1− [[geq1]]2λ) [[z′]]2λ
7 [[ρ(z)]]2λ ← [[pos]]2λ [[r]]2λ
8 return [[ρ(z)]]2λ
• The activation function ρ in line 7
• The multiplication of td − od with dd,i in line 9
Our secure LR training protocol piLR−Training (described in
Protocol 6) shows how the secure building blocks described
before can be used to securely compute these operations. The
inner product is securely computed using piIP on line 5, and
since this involves multiplication on numbers that are scaled
to a fixed-point representation, we truncate the result using
pitrunc. The activation function is securely computed using piρ
on line 6. The multiplication of td − od with xd,i is done
using secure multiplication with batching on line 11. Since
this also involves multiplication on numbers that are scaled,
the result is truncated using pitrunc in line 14. A slight differ-
ence between the full gradient descent technique described in
Algorithm 1 and our protocol piLR−Training, is that instead of
updating ∆wi after every evaluation of the activation function,
we batch together all activation function evaluations before
computing the ∆wi. Since the activation function requires a
bit-decomposition of the input, we can now make use of the
efficient batch bit-decomposition protocol batch-pidecompOPT
(see Appendix) within the activation function protocol piρ.
The LR training protocol piLR−Training UC-realizes the logis-
tic regression training functionality FLR−Training. The correct-
ness is trivial and the security follows straightforwardly from
the UC-security of the building blocks used in piLR−Training.
Functionality FLR−Training
Input: Upon receiving a message from Alice/Bob
with her/his shares of ([[xd]], [[td]]) for the set of
training examples D, record the shares, ignore any
subsequent messages from that party and inform the
other party about the receipt.
Output: Upon receipt of the inputs from both
parties, locally perform the same computational steps
as piρ using the secret sharings. Let [[w]] be the
resulting vector. Before the deliver of the output
9shares, a corrupt party can fix the shares that it
will get, in which case the other shares are adjusted
accordingly to still sum to w. The output shares are
delivered to the parties.
Protocol 6: Secure Logistic Regression Training Protocol
piLR−Training.
Input : ([[xd]], [[td]]) for a set of training examples D;
learning rate η; number of iterations niter. All
secret sharings in the description of this
protocol are in Z2λ and thus we simplify the
notation to [[·]].
Output: [[w]] for a vector of weights wi that minimize
the sum of squared errors over the training data
1 for i← 0 to m do
2 [[wi]]← 0
3 for 0 to niter do
4 for each (xd, td) in D do
5 [[zd]]← pitrunc(piIP([[〈w〉]], [[〈xd〉]]))
6 od ← piρ([[zd]])
7 for i← 0 to m do
8 [[∆wi]]← 0
9 for each (xd, td) in D do
10 [[vdiff ]]← 〈([[td]]− [[od]]), ..., ([[td]]− [[od]])〉 //
vector of length m
11 [[vgradient]]←batch-piDM([[vdiff ]], [[xd]])
12 [[∆w]]← [[∆w]] + [[vgradient]
13 for i← 0 to m do
14 [[∆wi]]← pitrunc([[∆wi]])
15 [[wi]]← [[wi]] + η[[∆wi]]
16 return [[w]]
The following steps describe end-to-end how to securely
train a LR classifier:
1) The TI sends the correlated randomness needed for
efficient secure multiplication to the data processors.
Note that while our current implementation has the TI
continuously sending the correlated randomness, it is
possible for the TI to send all correlated randomness as
the first step, and therefore can leave and not be involved
during the rest of the protocol.
2) Each data owner converts the values in the set of training
examples D that it holds to a fixed-point representation
as described in Equation 1. Each value is then split into
two shares, which are then sent to the data processor 1
and data processor 2 respectively.
3) Each data processor receives the shares of data from the
data owners. They now have secret sharings ([[xd]], [[td]])
of the set of training examples D. The learning rate η
and number of iterations niter are predetermined and
public to both data processors.
4) The data processors collaborate to train the LR model.
They both follow the secure LR training protocol
piLR−Training.
5) At the end of the protocol, each data processor will hold
shares of the model’s weights [[wi]]. Each data processor
sends their shares to all of the data owners, who can
then combine the shares to learn the weights of the LR
model.
J. Cryptographic Engineering Optimizations
1) Sockets and Threading: A single iteration of the LR
protocol is highly parallelizable in three distinct segments:
(1) computing the dot products between the current weights
and the data set, (2) computing the activation of each dot
product result, and (3) computing the gradient and updating
the weights. In each of these phases, a large number of compu-
tations are required, but none have dependencies on others. We
take advantage of this by completing each of these phases with
thread pools that can be configured for the machine running
the protocol. We implemented the proposed protocols in Rust;
with Rust’s ownership concept, it is possible to yield results
from threads without message passing or reallocation. Hence,
the code is constructed to transfer ownership of results at each
phase back to the main thread to avoid as much inter-process
communication as possible. Additionally, all threads complete
socket communications by computing all intermediate results
directly in the socket buffer by implementing the buffer as
a union of byte array and unsigned 64-bit integer array.
This buffer is allocated on the stack by each thread which
circumvents the need for a shared memory block while also
avoiding slower heap memory. The implementation of this
configuration reduced running times significantly based on our
trials.
Further, all modular arithmetic operations are handled im-
plicitly with the Rust API’s Wrapping struct which tells the
ALU to ignore integer overflow. As long as the size of the
ring over which the MPC protocols are performed is selected
to align with a provided primitive bit width (i.e. 8, 16, 32,
64, 128) it is possible to omit computing the remainder of
arithmetic with this construction.
III. RESULTS
We implemented the protocols from the Methods section
in Rust4 and experimentally evaluated them on the BC-TCGA
and GSE2034 data sets of the iDASH 2019 competition.
Both data sets contain gene expression data from breast can-
cer patients which are normal tissue/non-recurrence samples
(negative) or breast cancer tissue/recurrence tumor samples
(positive) [37]. We trained LR models on both data sets with
a learning rate η = 0.001. We use a fixed number of iterations
for each data set: 10 iterations for the BC-TCGA data set
and 223 iterations for the GSE2034 data set. The accuracy of
the resulting models, evaluated with 5-fold cross-validation,
is presented in Table I, along with the average runtime for
training those models. It is important to note that these are
the same accuracies that are obtained when training in the
clear, i.e. there is no accuracy loss in the secure version.
We used integer precision b = 15, fractional precision a =
12 and ring size λ = 64 (these choices were made based on
4https://bitbucket.org/uwtppml/idash2019
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TABLE I
ACCURACY AND TRAINING RUNTIME FOR LR MODELS
# features # pos. # neg. # of 5-fold CV avg.
samples samples of iterations accuracy runtime
BC-TCGA 17,814 422 48 10 99.58% 2.52 sec
GSE2034 12,634 142 83 223 64.82% 26.90 sec
TABLE II
RUNTIME COMPARISONS BETWEEN SECUREML AND OUR WORK
BC-TCGA training GSE2034 training activation function
(online) (online) (one evaluation)
Our work 2.52 sec 26.90 sec 0.030 ms
SecureML 12.73 sec 49.95 sec 0.057 ms
TABLE III
ACTIVATION FUNCTION RUNTIMES
# evaluations avg. runtime runtime per activation
(runtime/#eval)
256 9 ms 0.035 ms
512 16 ms 0.031 ms
1024 30 ms 0.029 ms
2048 59 ms 0.028 ms
experiments in the clear as mentioned in the previous section).
We ran the experiments on AWS c5.9xlarge machines with 36
vCPUs, 72.0 GiB Memory. Each of the parties ran on separate
machines (connected with a Gigabit Ethernet network), which
means that the results in Table I cover communication time
in addition to computation time. The results show that our
implementation allows to securely train models with state-of-
the-art accuracy [37] on the BC-TCGA and GSE2034 data sets
within about 2.52 seconds and 26.90 seconds respectively.
A previous version of this implementation was submitted
to the iDASH 2019 Track 4 competition. 9 of the 67 teams
who entered Track 4 completed the challenge. Our solution
was one of the 3 solutions who tied for the first place. Our
implementation trained on all of the features for both data
sets (no feature engineering is done), and generated a model
that gave the highest accuracy, with runtimes that were well
within the competition’s limit of 24 hours. The implementation
presented in the current work is further optimized in relation
to the iDASH version and achieves far better runtimes.
We note that while SecureML differs from our work in their
setup and cryptographic primitives, it shares many similarities
to ours and reports a fast runtime such that we find it valuable
as a standard to compare to. While SecureML does not
originally use a TI to predistribute the multiplication triples, it
would be easy to adapt their result to use a TI for that purpose.
Therefore, in order to have a fair comparison, we compare
our protocol runtime against only their online runtime (thus
excluding their offline runtime). We evaluated our implementa-
tion’s runtime against SecureML’s implementation by running
their implementation on the same AWS machines using the
same data sets (see Table II for runtime comparisons). For
both data sets, our online phase runs faster than SecureML’s
online phase which trains BC-TCGA in 12.73 seconds and
GSE2034 in 49.95 seconds.
We then compare online microbenchmark computation
times. For the computation of the activation function, our run
of the SecureML code reported around 0.057 ms to 0.059
ms for 1 activation, while our implementation completes 1024
evaluations in around 30 ms (0.029 ms per activation function).
This makes our secure activation function implementation
nearly twice as fast as SecureML’s. Additionally, it eliminates
the overhead of switching between Yao gates and additive
secret sharing. Furthermore, our activation function runs more
efficiently (per evaluation) the more evaluations of it need to
be computed, due to the design of the batch bit-decomposition
protocol. This is illustrated in Table III where the calculated
runtime per evaluation (runtime divided by number of evalu-
ations) decreases as the number of evaluations increase.
IV. DISCUSSION
Our runtime experiments on securely training a LR model
show that it is feasible to train on data that includes a large
number of attributes, as is common with genomic data. Given
the high dimensionality of the genomic data, an interesting
direction for future work would be the design of MPC pro-
tocols for privacy-preserving feature reduction. If any kind of
feature reduction is used, it would result in a decrease in secure
training runtime with a possibility for a slight decrease in the
accuracy. We demonstrate this by choosing (in the clear) 54
features of the BC-TCGA data set that were part of the 76-gene
signature described in [36]. Training on these 54 features, we
get a 5-fold cross-validation accuracy of 98.93% (training on
all features produced 99.58%), and the average secure training
time (of three runs) is 0.51 seconds, which is about a 2 second
decrease from training on all 17,814 features. The genes in
the GSE2034 data set are not labeled in a way where we
can map them to the 76-gene signature to test the accuracy
for a reduced number of features, but we test the runtime
of training on 76 attributes and we get an average of 6.71
seconds, which is about a 20 second decrease from training
on all 12,634 features. This shows that if feature reduction can
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be performed, runtimes can be improved while still being able
to produce an accurate trained model.
Our main contribution is the proposal of the fastest imple-
mentation and protocol for privacy-preserving training of LR
models. Our novelty points are the new protocol for privately
evaluating the activation function ρ which can be computed
using only additive shares and MPC protocols, without using a
protocol for secure comparison. We use ρ as an approximation
of the sigmoid function σ since that is what is traditionally
used in LR training, but σ is also used as an activation function
in neural networks. Therefore, our fast secure protocol for
computing ρ can also result in faster neural network training.
While training neural networks are out of the scope of this
paper, we note that our results can be applicable to those types
of ML models as well.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have described a novel protocol for imple-
menting secure training of LR over distributed parties using
MPC. Our protocol and implementation present several novel
points and optimizations compared to existing work, including:
(i) a novel protocol for computing the activation function that
avoids the use of full-fledged secure comparison protocols; (ii)
a series of cryptographic engineering optimizations to improve
the performance.
With our implementation, we can train on the BC-TCGA
data set with 17,814 features and 375 samples with 10 iter-
ations in 2.52 seconds, and we can train on the GSE2034
data set with 12,634 features and 179 samples with 223
iterations in 26.90 seconds. A less optimized version of this
implementation won first place at the iDASH 2019 Track 4
competition when considering accuracy and efficiency. Our
solution is particularly efficient for LANs where we can
perform 1024 secure computations of the activation function in
about 30 ms. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the fastest
protocol for privately training logistic regression models over
local area networks.
APPENDIX
Optimization of pidecomp
Overview and Previous Work: The functionality Fdecomp
(described in Section Methods) is easily realized as an adder
circuit that takes as inputs each bit of the additive shares
of a secret sharing [[x]]2λ in a large ring Z2λ and outputs
an “XOR-sharing” of the secret [[x1]]2, . . . , [[xλ]]2. First, each
party regards its share of [[x]]2λ , denoted xi, as an XOR-
shared secret [[xi,1]]2, . . . , [[xi,λ]]2 and passes it to the adder
circuit. The adder circuit then computes the carry vector
which accounts for the rollover of binary addition. Adding
this vector to all bitwise shares [[x1,j ]]2, [[x2,j ]]2 resolves the
difference between [[x1,1]]...[[x1,λ]]⊕[[x2,1]]...[[x2,λ]] and the bit-
decomposed secret x.
Naively, this carry vector can be obtained with linear com-
munication complexity by means of ripple carry addition, as is
described in Protocol 3. But, it is possible to achieve logarith-
mic communication complexity and even constant complexity
[33] (though with worse performance than the logarithmic
version for all reasonable bit lengths).
The highest performing realization of Fdecomp for realistic
bit lengths is based on a speculative adder circuit [12] in which
at each layer the next set of carry bits are computed twice;
once for each case that the previous carry bit had been 0 and
1. This protocol has dlog(λ)e + 2 rounds of communication
and requires a total data transfer of 4λdlog(λ)e+ 6λ bits.
We propose a new, highly optimised protocol based on
a matrix composition network that reduces the number of
communication rounds by 1 (or 2, in special cases) and
requires a small fraction of the aforementioned data transfer
cost.
Matrix composition network: To sum the binary numbers
a and b, the i-th bit is given by si = ai ⊕ bi ⊕ ci−1, where
ci = aibi⊕aici−1⊕bici−1. In an alternate view, the carry can
be seen to depend on two signals which in turn depend on a
and b. Generate (gi = aibi) creates a new carry bit at the i-th
position, and Propogate (pi = ai⊕bi) perpetuates the previous
carry bit, if it exists. In this representation, si = pi⊕ ci−1 and
ci = gi+pici−1. This sum-of-products form of the expression
for ci lends itself to a matrix representation[
ci
1
]
=
[
pi gi
0 1
] [
ci−1
1
]
= Mi
[
ci−1
1
]
.
When matrices in the form of Mi are composed, the lower
entries remain unchanged. This implies that
[
ci
1
]
=
[
pi gi
0 1
] [
pi−1 gi−1
0 1
] [
ci−2
1
]
= MiMi−1
[
ci−2
1
]
.
Therefore, to compute all ci, it is sufficient to compute the
set of all matrix compositions
i∏
j=1
Mj
∣∣∣∣ 1 ≤ i < λ
 .
Note that it is not necessary to compute the λ-th carry bit
because sλ depends on cλ−1. Treating the carry-in to the 1st
bit as the vector (0, 1), all ci can be derived implicitly from the
upper right-hand entry of M1.i (here, M1,i denotes the matrix
composed of all matrices M1 through Mi, consecutively).
From the MPC perspective, this matrix composition requires
two Z2 multiplications: pi+1pi and pi+1gi as seen in the
equation below. The OR operation (+), which usually requires
multiplication in MPC, is reduced to XOR based on the
observation that pi+1 and gi+1 cannot both be true for a given
i.
[
pi+1 gi+1
0 1
] [
pi gi
0 1
]
=
[
pi+1pi pi+1gi + gi+1
0 1
]
The entire set of matrix compositions can be realized in a
logarithmic depth network by, at the i-th layer, computing all
compositions M1.j that require fewer than 2i−1 compositions.
To set up conditions to allow us to minimize the total data
transfer, the constraint is added that each M1.j should be the
composition of the “largest” matrix from the previous layer,
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M1.2i−2 , with the remainder M2i−2+1.j . If M2i−2+1.j doesn’t
exist in the network, it is added recursively following the same
set of constraints.
Figure 4 shows an example with λ = 17. This network is
hereafter referred to as ComposeNetp where p is the highest
order bit to decompose. The protocol description that follows
considers only the case where p = λ, though the protocol
functions the same for any p ≤ λ. For instance, in Protocol 3,
when using pidecomp to find the MSB of a secret, it is sufficient
to set p = a+ b+ 1.
Protocol 7: Secure Protocol pidecompOPT for computing
Fdecomp more efficiently.
Input : [[x]]2λ
Output: [[x1]]2...[[xλ]]2
1 Party i regards its share xi as pi,1, . . . , pi,λ s.t.
2 [[pj ]]2,= p1,j ⊕ p2,j for j = 1, . . . , λ
3 Party 1 creates the sharing [[g1,j ]]2 = (p1,j , 0).
4 Party 2 creates the sharing [[g2,j ]]2 = (0, p2,j).
5 [[gj ]]2 ← [[g1,j ]]2[[g2,j ]]2
6 [[Mj ]]2 ←
[
[[pj ]]2 [[gj ]]2
0 1
]
for all j
7 {[[M1.j ]]2|1 ≤ j < λ} ← ComposeNetλ([[M ]]2)
8 [[cj ]]2 ← the upper right entry of [[M1.j ]]2
9 [[s1]]2 ← [[p1]]2
10 [[sj ]]2 ← [[pj ]]2 ⊕ [[cj−1]]2 for all j > 1
11 return [[s1]]2...[[sλ]]2
Efficiency discussion: The setup phase prior to the call to
ComposeNetλ requires λ multiplications over Z2 to compute
all [[gj ]]. This corresponds to one communication round and
2λ bits of data transfer.
A call to ComposeNetλ has communication complexity
corresponding to the depth of the network, dlog(λ − 1)e,
and λ2 multiplications over Z2 per layer, with fewer on the
final layer when λ − 1 is not a power of 2. However, due to
the fact that the matrices at each node of ComposeNetλ are
reused extensively and known to not change value, the Beaver
Triples used to mask the matrices can be desgined to contain
redundancies to minimise the data transfer at each layer [28].
By re-using correlated randomness where information leakage
is not possible, only λ2−(2i−i−1) masks need to be transferred
at depth i, for i > 0. At depth 0, there are λ masks; one for
each matrix. Each matrix mask is 2 bits (one for each of the
Propogate and Generate bits), so the total data transfer is
2λ+ 2
∑dlog(λ−1)e−1
i=1 (
λ
2 + 1− 2i−1).
The recombination phase after ComposeNetλ is computed
has only local computations and thus contributes nothing to
the complexity.
Combining all phases, we see that pidecompOPT has a com-
munication cost of dlog(λ− 1)e+ 1 and a total data transfer
cost of 4λ+ 2
∑dlog(λ−1)e−1
i=1 (
λ
2 + 1− 2i−1) bits. Comparing
with the speculative adder’s performance, the number of
communication rounds is decreased by 1 in all cases and 2
in the case that λ− 1 is a power of 2. The total data transfer
cost has roughly 13 the data transfer rate of the previous work
at λ = 8, 16. For higher all bit lengths, the ratio quickly
converges near 14 .
Implementation and Batching: ComposeNetλ can be imple-
mented efficiently as a set of index pairs that correspond to the
positions of the Propogate and Generate bits that need to be
combined at each layer. Once per layer, all products pi+1pi,
pi+1gi can be computed in a single call to piDM by taking the
bitwise product between the concatenations pi+1||pi+1, pi||gi
and splitting the result.
Extending to the case that many values need to be bit
decomposed at the same time (as in Protocol 6), a vector
of inputs can be decomposed “in parallel” by taking vertical
slices over the Generate and Propogate bits of each element
and re-packing them into a transposed form. In this way, each
layer of ComposeNetλ can operate on a vector of matrices
(represented as two lists of bit slices) to produce a vector of
matrix compositions. This method has no effect on the number
of rounds of communication and the total data transfer scales
linearly with the length of the input vector.
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